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This paper analyzes the impact of trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) on drug 
prices in  seven middle income  countries. Applying  both  an  econometric  as  well as  an 
explorative analysis we find three key messages: First, the introduction of TRIPS in the 
selected  countries  tends  to  have  no  major  impact  on  the  development  of  drug  prices. 
Country specific factors like excessive procurement and marketing costs seem to be more 
important  determinants  for  the  observed  high  price  levels.  Second,  the  application  of 
TRIPS safeguards which allow countries to override TRIPS requirements appears to be an 
important lever to contain drug prices by encouraging competition. There seems, however, 
scope for  improvement  in  the  efficient  use  of  these  safeguards.  Third,  with  respect  to 
policy implications, middle income countries should in particular address inefficiencies in 
local  marketing  and  procurement  costs  whereas  OECD  countries  need  to  improve  the 
coherence between trade and aid policies.  
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1  Introduction
1 
Diseases are one of the major obstacles to economic and human development in large 
parts  of  the  world.  Among  them,  HIV/AIDS  and  Malaria  are  particularly  considered  to 
create a severe damage. According to World Health Organisation (WHO) sources 3 million 
and more than 1 million people died of the two respective diseases worldwide last year 
(WHO,  2002a).  While  the  death  toll  and  the  rate  of  infections  have  been  steadily 
increasing,  one  third  of  the  global  population  still  lacks  regular  access  to  essential 
medicines. Improving access to drugs in developing countries remains, therefore, a crucial 
challenge for the entire global community in the years to come. 
 
In  line  with  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  the  WHO  (2004)  has  developed  a 
framework  how  to  improve  access  to  essential  medicines.  According  to  this  “Access 
Framework” policymakers are urged to put policies and action plans in place in order to 
achieve the following four goals in a coherent way: Affordable prices, rational selection and 
use of essential medicines, sustainable financing, and reliable supply systems. 
 
This paper focuses on the first policy goal namely on drug prices and its determinants. It 
contributes hereby to the ongoing debate on patents and medicines which has intensified 
since  trade-related  intellectual  property  rights  (TRIPS)  had  been  incorporated  in  the 
multilateral trading system in 1994 (Roffe et al., 2006). In a very simplified and stylised 
way, the “TRIPS and Public Health” debate can be divided into two different camps: On 
the  one  hand,  civil  society  and  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  argue  that 
multinational research-based pharmaceutical companies misuse trade-related intellectual 
property rights in order to charge higher prices for their patented products (Baker, 2007; 
MSF, 2001; Myhr, 2000; Oxfam, 2002). According to this view, TRIPS impose a severe 
barrier to accessing essential drugs. Proponents of TRIPS such as leading pharmaceutical 
and biotechnology companies, on the other hand, claim that a globally respected patent 
system  for  pharmaceuticals  is  a  vital  precondition  for  drug  producers  to  undertake 
research and development on medicine in the first place (Bale, 2000). Furthermore, they 
argue that TRIPS do not have a major influence on local drug prices in contrast to country-
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specific factors (such as tariffs, non-tariff barriers, taxes, excessive wholesale and retail 
mark-ups). Latter are considered to have the strongest impact on local drug prices and the 
level of accessibility to essential medicines (Bale, 2001; Bate et al., 2005; Bate et al., 
2006; Levison, 2003). 
 
Against this background, the main objective of this paper is to analyze the potential impact 
of trade related intellectual property rights on prices for essential drugs in middle income 
countries. The scope of the analysis will hereby include drug products in two devastating 
disease  areas  (HIV/  AIDS  and  Malaria)  across  seven  countries  dispersed  over  Africa 
(Morocco,  Tunisia,  and  South  Africa)  and  Asia  (Jordan,  Philippines,  Thailand,  and 
Malaysia). This paper - being one of the first in this research area to use both qualitative 
as well as quantitative approaches in its analysis - gives a comprehensive picture of what 
determines local drug prices in middle-income countries.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 has a brief introduction of the specific 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical industry. Subsequently, a conceptual framework is 
developed, separating drug price determinants into the following two groups: TRIPS on the 
one hand and country-specific factors on the other hand. In Section 3 explanations are 
given why the two disease areas and the seven countries have been selected for this 
analysis.  Subsequently,  in  Section  4  the  methodology  and  the  data,  including  its 
limitations, are presented. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2  Patents, Prices and Access to Medicines 
2.1  Specific Characteristics of the Pharmaceutical Industry  
Drug pricing is determined by market forces and a set of government policies. Like any 
other  business,  pharmaceutical  companies  pursue  to  maximize  profit  and  shareholder 
value in the market. Still, two major industry-specific characteristics make this business 
very special: First, pharmaceutical companies “supply products that affect human welfare 
in a way that most other products do not: antiretroviral drugs are not coca cola” (Saggi, 
2006: 3). Secondly, pharmaceutical companies are among the most research-intensive 
corporations in the world and are therefore highly dependent on intellectual property right   3 
systems  (IPRs)  in  order  to  recuperate  the  high  research  and  development  (R&D) 
expenditures. Heavy R&D investment induces high fixed costs whereas the marginal cost 
of production is relatively low (Kremer, 2002; Saggi, 2006).  
 
In this discrepancy lies the crux of the problem: Economic efficiency implies that a product 
is supplied to all consumers at marginal cost. Pharmaceutical companies, however, have 
to earn more than the marginal cost in order to recover the high fixed costs. To resolve this 
market failure governments intervene by enforcing product patent legislation which grants 
innovator firms a temporary monopoly status. However, if drug prices are the same around 
the globe, large parts of the world will not be able to afford urgently needed medicaments. 
To  avoid  such  a  scenario  governments  of  the  OECD  countries  have  accepted  that 
pharmaceutical  companies  can  charge  their  consumers  a  higher  price  for  the  same 
medicaments than their counterparts in the developing world. While price discrimination 
between the developed and the developing world is appropriate for drugs against diseases 
prevailing in both high and low income countries it can not be considered as a feasible 
strategy for drugs against diseases afflicting only developing countries. In the latter case 
the costs of researching and developing drugs will have to be entirely born by low income 
countries.  Given  the  lower  purchasing  power  of  the  developing  world  pharmaceutical 
companies  anticipate  lower  prices  and  are  therefore  less  willing  to  invest  in  R&D. 
Additionally  they  are  confronted  with  a  time-inconsistency  problem:  In  contrast  to  the 
OECD world developing countries often lack well developed and respected IPRs. As a 
result, once a drug is developed national governments pursue to force prices down to the 
market efficient level while generic producers start to imitate the product (Kremer, 2002; 
Saggi, 2006).  
 
2.2  Determinants of Drug Pricing in Developing Countries 
While  trade-related  intellectual  property  rights  are  a  necessary  prerequisite  for 
pharmaceutical companies to do research the incorporation of TRIPS into the multilateral 
trading system has raised significant protests from NGOs and civic society organisations. 
The “TRIPS and Public Health” debate centres hereby around the question if TRIPS or 
country-specific factors such as tariffs, taxes or excessive mark-ups on pharmaceuticals 
have rendered drug prices unaffordable throughout the developing world.    4 
2.2.1  The TRIPS Controversy 
The relationship between patents and medicines has been controversial ever since the 
signing  of  the  Paris  Convention  of  1883.  This  first  major  international  treaty  on  the 
protection of industrial property acted as a catalyst leaving “countries with the freedom to 
legislate in the industrial sectors that they considered appropriate for granting exclusive 
production and marketing rights. As a result, medicine was an area that many countries 
generally  excluded  from  patentability”  (Roffe  et  al.,  2006:  9).  The  rationale  for  this 
exclusion  was  two-fold:  on  the  one  hand,  policymakers  wanted  to  keep  prices  down 
thereby assuring full affordability of essential medicines; on the other hand, policymakers 
were interested in nurturing the infantile national pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, 
patent  protection  only  included  processes  instead  of  products  in  most  developing  and 
developed  countries  until  the  mid  1970s.  With  the  emergence  of  the  multinational 
pharmaceutical  industry,  policymakers  in  OECD  countries  came  increasingly  under 
pressure to extend patentability from pharmaceutical processes to products. Low income 
countries such  as  India and Pakistan,  on  the  contrary,  held  on to their  existing  patent 
protection legislation which exclusively focused on industrial processes (Maria/ Ramani, 
2005; Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 2002; Roffe et al., 2006).  
 
In this context, the incorporation of intellectual property rights into the multilateral trading 
system  is  considered  as  a  fundamental  break  from  past  developments.  The  TRIPS 
Agreement obliged each member state of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) to align its 
patent  legislation  with  the  multilaterally  accepted  intellectual  property  rules.  Amongst 
others,  latter  implied  full  product  patentability  for  medicines  for  a  minimum  duration  of 
twenty years (WHO, 2002b). While the 1994 enforcement of the TRIPS Agreement was 
welcomed as a milestone in the history of international trade by the WTO and other inter-
governmental organisations as well as policymakers of high income countries it received a 
growing level of criticism from both civil society organisations as well as policymakers in 
the developing world. More precisely, a multitude of different objections was raised against 
the TRIPS Agreement: First, critics argued that trade-related intellectual property rights 
were  not  going  to  improve,  but  rather  aggravate  the  health  situation  in  low-income 
countries. According to this view multinational pharmaceutical companies did not consider 
TRIPS as an incentive system to invest in research and development of medicines against 
diseases afflicting poorer nations, but rather misused TRIPS to charge higher prices for 
already existing patented medicaments. This argument was substantiated by the fact that   5 
prices of patented drugs have been increasing throughout the developing world while at 
the same time only one percent of almost 1400 new drugs approved for sale in 1975-1999 
were  oriented  at  tropical  diseases  (The  Economist,  2003).  Secondly,  industrialised 
countries were accused of having imposed a legal framework that would not only have a 
negative  welfare  effect  for  low  income  countries,  but  also  for  the  world  as  a  whole 
(Chaudhuri et al., 2003; Deardorff, 1992). Moreover, proponents of this view did not only 
fear that the local generic pharmaceutical industry was doomed to exit the market, but that 
the overall technological gap would widen undermining any development process of the 
low income countries (Barton, 1999; Correa, 1999; Sachs, 1999). 
 
With mounting pressure to resolve the “TRIPS and Public Health” debate WTO member 
states entered into negotiations to readjust the 1994 TRIPS Agreement. As a result, the 
2001 Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health was born. Considered 
by the WTO as a final breakthrough for the relationships between OECD and developing 
countries the declaration recognized “the gravity of the public health problems afflicting 
many  developing  countries  [...],  especially  those  resulting  from  HIV/AIDS,  tuberculosis, 
malaria” and stressed the need for the TRIPS Agreement ‘’to be part of the wider national 
and international action to address these problems” (WTO, 2001: 1). As a result, it was 
agreed upon “that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking  measures  to  protect  public  health”  (WTO,  2001:  1).  More  precisely,  the  refined 
TRIPS Agreement provides today important flexibilities – TRIPS safeguards – that enable 
“governments [in developing countries] to make exceptions to patent holders’ rights such 
as  in  national  emergencies,  anti-competitive  practices,  or  if  the  right-holder  does  not 
supply the invention, provided certain conditions are fulfilled” (WTO, 2006a: 2). Amongst 
others, three safeguards play a very prominent role in the public health area of developing 
countries: Compulsory licensing, parallel importation, and bolar provision. 
 
Compulsory  licensing  refers  to  an  authorization  granted  by  the  government  to  use  an 
invention without the consent of the patent holder.
2 Parallel importation can be defined as 
importation  (without  the  permission  of  the  patent  holder)  of  a  patented  product  that  is 
marketed in another country. Bolar provision facilitates the entry of generic competitors by 
                                                 
2 Besides allowing members to authorize (without the consent of the patent holder) use by third 
parties (compulsory licensing) the TRIPS Agreement also permits members to use an invention for 
public non-commerical use (government use) without the consent of the patent holder (TRIPS, 
2006b; Oh, 2005).     6 
permitting testing and regulatory approval in advance of the patent expiration date (WHO, 
2002b). Recently, the declaration has been temporarily (in 2003) and then permanently (in 
2005) modified in order to allow countries that do not have feasible production capacities 
in  place  to  import  pharmaceuticals  under  compulsory  licensing.  Furthermore,  granting 
additional time in order to bring national legislation in conformity with TRIPS rules WTO 
member states have agreed to extend the existing transition period (1995-2000) for two 
kinds of developing countries: Developing countries that provided only process patents 
before the signing of the TRIPS Agreement could delay their compliance until 1
st January 
2005
3 while the least-developed countries are still excluded from patent enforcement until 
1
st January 2016 (WTO, 2006b). Figure 1 summarises the milestones of TRIPS legislation 











Despite these recent achievements to strike a balance between the interests of the global 
pharmaceutical industry and the social needs of developing countries, the “TRIPS and 
Public Health” debate is still far from being resolved. In 2002 prominent trade economists 
such as Bhagwati still considered the policy of “getting IPR into the WTO, in shape of the 
TRIPS  […]  regime,  […]  a  bad  mistake”  (Bhagwati,  2002:  14).  In  2003,  a  number  of 
influential  non-governmental  organisations  published  a  joint  statement  denouncing  the 
Doha Declaration and its temporary waiver to be a gift to the poor “bound tightly in red 
tape” (Act Up Paris et al., 2003). In 2006, one year after the signing of the permanent 
                                                 
3 During the transition period, these countries are required to accept patent applications from 1995 
onwards and to keep such applications pending, in a patent “mailbox” until the mailbox is opened in 
2005 when the applications will be assessed (WTO, 2006b). 
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waiver,  Pascal  Lamy,  Director  General  of  the  WTO,  considered  the  fact  that  his 
organisation  “had  not  received  a  single  notification  of  a  developing  country  issuing  a 
compulsory licence […] a problem, […] arguing that it was cited by some as proof that the 
current flexibilities were too complex to be used in practice” (Jack, 2006: 8). Moreover, 
criticism has also been targeted at recent attempts by the USA and other OECD countries 
to  sign  free  trade  agreements  (including  TRIPS+  provisions)  with  developing  countries 
such as Thailand. According to NGOs and civic society organisations these provisions 
undermine the use of TRIPS flexibilities and as a result make drugs unaffordable. 
 
The above statements are at odds with the pharmaceutical industry’s point of view, which 
considers the fact that no compulsory licence has been issued so far rather as a proof that 
the  industry  has  sufficiently  reduced  drug  prices  in  developing  countries  (Jack,  2006). 
Unsurprisingly,  the  International  Federation  of  Pharmaceutical  Manufacturers  & 
Associations (IFPMA), therefore, does not see any need for action with respect to TRIPS 
safeguards,  but  rather  continues  to  postulate  stronger  intellectual  property  rights 
enforcement  throughout  the  developing  world.  More  precisely,  private  pharmaceutical 
companies – being more innovative than public institutions regarding medicines against 
AIDS and Malaria (Ito/ Yamagata, 2005) – criticize both the “lack of intellectual property 
protection and the tendency for governments to force prices down after firms have sunk 
their research and development costs” (Kremer, 2002: 10). By referring to the fact that 95 
percent of products on the WHO Model Essential Drug List (EDL)
4 are off-patent, they 
further  emphasize  their  disagreement  with  NGOs  and  policymakers  of  developing 
countries (Attaran, 2004; Bale, 2001). However, this argument is highly problematic since 
essential  medicines  are  not  only  selected  by  the  WHO  on  the  basis  of  public  health 
relevance,  efficacy  or  safety, but  also  based on  comparative  cost-effectiveness (WHO, 
2006a). Latter implies that patent products are often deemed unaffordable according to the 
criteria  set  by  the  WHO  and  therefore  are  not  put  on  the  EDL  despite  their  potential 
efficacy to satisfy serious health care needs (Love, 2004). 
                                                 
4 The EDL concept was developed by the WHO in 1977 and constitutes one of the eight pillars of 
the multilateral organisation’s “Primary Health Care” strategy (also see www.essentialdrugs.org). 
Essential drugs or now called essential medicines “are those that satisfy the priority health care 
needs of the population. They are selected with due regard to public health relevance, evidence on 
efficacy and safety, and comparative cost-effectiveness” (WHOa, 2006: 54).      8 
2.2.2  Country-specific Determinants of Drug Pricing 
Proponents of TRIPS hold the view that innovator brand pharmaceutical producers cannot 
be held responsible for the increase of drug prices in developing countries since these 
companies face increasing market pressure from therapeutic competitors and therefore 
cannot afford to augment their prices in the first place (Bale, 2000). As a result, the main 
determinants of drug prices in developing countries are assumed to be of country-specific 
nature:  state-imposed  price  inflators  of  pharmaceuticals  such  as  tariff  and  non-tariff 
barriers,  duties  and  sales  taxes;  local  procurement  and  distribution  costs  related  to 
storage, transportation and distribution including mark-ups for wholesaler and retail level 
(Bale, 2000; Bate et al., 2006). 
 
In line with the above stated view Harvey Bale (2001: 12), Director-General of IFPMA, 
points out that drug prices as a potential barrier to access should not just reflect “the cost 
of  the  drug  itself,  [but  also]  the  costs  of  effectively  distributing,  administering  and 
monitoring its use; and the financing to pay for” both cost components. Import tariffs, port 
charges, sales tax as well as other local charges (wholesale/ retail mark-ups) sometimes 
amount to a mark-up of more than 80 percent on the ex-manufacturing selling price (Bate 
et al., 2006).  
 
Recently, various cross-country studies such as Bale (2001) and European Commission 
(2003) have provided further evidence in favour of a negative correlation between tariffs on 
pharmaceuticals and access to drugs. Yet, as Laing/ Olcay (2005) pointed out tariffs do 
not have a major impact (relative to other country-specific factors) on drug prices anymore. 
While tariffs on active pharmaceutical ingredients and finished pharmaceutical products 
are levied respectively by fifty-nine and sixty-one percent of countries under analysis both 
authors emphasise that ninety percent of these countries apply tariff rates lower than ten 
percent. Besides tariffs non-tariff barriers such as bureaucratic hurdles to register a drug 
product or clear the customs can also increase the price of a drug. Sales taxes as well as 
port  charges  are  additional  drug  price  inflators.  Some  countries  even  tax  life-saving 
medicaments that are donated for free (Bate et al., 2006).    
 
Besides  the  above  mentioned  state-imposed  drug  price  inflators,  governments  in 
developing  countries  are  also  increasingly  held  accountable  for  inefficient  procurement 
activities related to domestic healthcare issues. According to Bale (2001: 12) procurement   9 
with regards to pharmaceuticals can be defined as “the sum total of processes involved in 
the purchase and delivery of drugs”. It is deemed efficient if it is in accordance with the 
EDL concept; latter implying that “the most cost-effective drugs are bought in the most 
appropriate quantities from reputable suppliers, delivered where and when required, at the 
lowest possible total cost” (Bale, 2001: 12) So far most developing countries lack efficient 
drug procurement systems. It is not rare to see mark-ups as high as 40 to 60 percent 
above  the  import  price  of  pharmaceuticals  paid  by  end-customers  to  wholesalers  and 
retailers along the pharmaceutical supply chain (Bate et al., 2006).  
 
The root of these inefficiencies can be traced back to a number of traits typical for health 
care systems in the developing world: First, health care expenditures are characterised by 
relatively high rates of out-of-pocket expenditures and rather low rates of expenditures 
paid by public and private insurance firms. Consumers negotiate on an individual level and 
therefore are faced with problems of asymmetric information. This situation stands in sharp 
contrast  to  the  health  care  markets  of  the  developed  world  where  public  or  private 
institutions pool customers in order to dispose monopsony power when bargaining with 
pharmaceutical companies (Hellerstein, 2003). Secondly, alongside the appropriate health 
expenditure system the degree of local generic and therapeutic competition also plays a 
vital role in keeping drug prices in developing countries low (Hellerstein, 2003; Lucchini et 
al., 2003; Oxfam, 2002). Thirdly, the efficiency of transportation and distribution systems 
as well as the degree of competition in the wholesale and retail markets have a major 
influence on drug prices too. For instance, Woodward (2001: 7) estimates that “variations 
in  local  costs  may  result  in  prices  being  roughly  doubled  in  the  highest-cost  countries 
relative to the lowest.” Finally fourth, governments are accused of taking on a lax attitude 
to enforcing an optimal drug policy. NGOs encourage policymakers to maximize the use of 
TRIPS safeguards in order to intensify competition and thereby bring drug prices down 
(MSF, 2001; Oxfam, 2002).  
 
To  sum  up,  it  is  very  much  an  empirical  question  whether  or  not  TRIPS  has  a  major 
influence on drug prices in developing countries.    10 
3  Methodology  
3.1  Selection of Illnesses and Countries  
To  assess  the  impact  of  TRIPS  on  drug  prices  in  developing  countries  the  following 
procedure has been applied: First, disease areas have been chosen. Secondly, seven 
emerging  and  developing  countries  in  Africa  and  Asia  have  been  selected.  Thirdly,  a 
balanced empirical approach combining various research techniques has been conducted.  
 
Selecting HIV/ AIDS and Malaria as disease areas for our empirical investigation can be 
reasoned by the fact that these two illnesses pose a severe burden for the socio-economic 
development of local populations in developing countries. From a more practical point of 
view, the  decision  to focus on drug prices  related  to  these  two  disease  areas  can  be 
explained by the following reasons: First, as the research on treatment of these illnesses 
has  been  ongoing  enough  patent  and  off-patent  drug  products  exist  to  measure  the 
relative  impact  of  TRIPS  vis-à-vis  other  price  determinants.  Secondly,  comprehensive 
price data (dating back until 1994) of medicaments against the two illnesses is available. 
 
Seven emerging and developing countries in Africa and Asia have been chosen to conduct 
the empirical investigation: Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, 
and Tunisia. The selection of these countries was based on the following criteria: First, the 
TRIPS Agreement has been successfully implemented during the first transition period or 
in an early stage of the second transition period.  South Africa enforced TRIPS in 1997. 
Following the TRIPS provisions for developing and emerging countries Jordan, Malaysia, 
the Philippines and Thailand brought their national IPR legislation in line with WTO rules 
until 2000. The North-African countries Morocco
5 and Tunisia
6 belonging to the second 
transition country group updated their legislation to meet TRIPS requirements as early as 
2004 (EIU Country Commerce Reports, 2005/ 2006; Strategis, 2004; Teljeur, 2002; USTR 
2006; WTO, 2006b). Secondly, all countries dispose local pharmaceutical capacity in order 
to  produce  generic  drug  products,  inducing  domestic  competition  for  patent  protected 
western products. Thirdly, a national health system exists that can deliver the requested 
                                                 
5 Morocco signed a free trade agreement (including TRIPS+ provisions) with the USA in 2004. 
6 According to Strategis (2004) Tunisia’s national legislation was brought in line with TRIPS rules in 
2004. However, comprehensive IPR enforcement was still not fully ensured by then.    11 
medication. Fourthly, data for drug prices is available for both disease areas in all seven 
countries. 
 
3.2  Estimating the “TRIPS-Effect” 
The first challenge in the endeavour to measure the relative impact of TRIPS vis-à-vis 
country-specific determinants on drug prices in developing countries has been to establish 
an appropriate price index for each disease area (HIV/ AIDS and Malaria) in each country 
for the time period 1994-2004. The index comprising of patent, off-patent and generic drug 
products which are measured as retail drug prices in international dollars per standard unit 




This paper takes two empirical approaches to measure the relative impact of TRIPS vis-à-
vis country-specific determinants on drug prices in developing countries. The first method 
is a simple exploration of the trend of real public (also known as retail) drug prices in 
international dollars (purchasing power parity (PPP)) per standard unit for every disease 
area in each of the seven countries for the period 1994-2004. The aim of visualizing these 
country-specific price indices is to inspect the data series for any obvious structural breaks 
in the price trend or any rapid changes in the price level due to the implementation of the 
TRIPS Agreement. The hypothesis is hereby the following: If TRIPS has an impact on drug 
prices the increase of the price index should take the form of a structural break at the 
moment of TRIPS implementation for two reasons: First, cheap generic competitors will 
exit  the market  and  as a result  patented  products  will have more  weight  in  the index. 
Secondly,  it  is  assumed  that  TRIPS  will  increase  the  prices  of  patented  drugs. 
Furthermore, country-specific mark-ups are presented for all seven countries. In theory, 
the overall mark-up is defined as the difference between retail and manufacturing prices. It 
encompasses all costs, legal and illegal, as well as retail profits to get the product from the 
manufacturer to the final consumer.
8 Hence, the lower the mark-up on a product the more 
effective is the country-specific distribution of the given product. Taking both the trend of 
                                                 
7 See Appendix A for a more comprehensive analysis of how the price indices for each disease 
area have been constructed. A.1 gives insights into the methodological procedure of the index 
construction. Furthermore, A.2 provides as an example a detailed list of all medicaments included in 
the HIV/ AIDS antiretrovirals price index for South Africa.  
8 See Appendix B for a summary of the theoretical composition of a retail price mark-up.   12 
real public drug prices as well the mark-up structure for each country into account first 
conclusions can be drawn that are further tested in the quantitative analysis. 
 
As a second method an econometric analysis is conducted in order to measure the relative 
effect of TRIPS on real public drug prices in the seven countries under inspection. More 
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Where Pijt, the real public price in international dollars (PPP) per standard unit in country i, 
anatomical therapy class (ATC)
9 j and at time t, is a function of the following independent 
variables: First, GDPpc (real constant gross domestic product per capita PPP in country i at 
time t) is a control variable for real income. Following Engel’s law a positive correlation 
between  real  income  and  demand  for  medication  is  assumed  (Engel,  1857).  As  the 
demand for drugs increases with growing income per capita, drug prices are also assumed 
to augment. Secondly, CPI (consumer price index in country i at time t) is incorporated in 
the  model  to  control  for  general  price  level  effects  on  the  real  public  prices  of  drugs. 
Thirdly, TRIPS is a simple time dummy taking the value one for all years since the TRIPS 
Agreement has been enforced. In case the TRIPS Agreement has rendered drug prices 
unaffordable the coefficient of the control variable should have a significant positive value. 
Fourthly, HealthGDP (ratio of total health expenditure relative to GDP in country i at time t) 
is a proxy for the development of the national health system in country i. As mentioned in 
Part I one of the main characteristics of the health care markets in the developed world is 
that public or private institutions pool customers in order to dispose monopsony power 
when bargaining with pharmaceutical companies (Hellerstein, 2003). Thus, it is assumed 
that the more developed a country i’s health care market is the lower will be the prices for 
the procurement of drugs due to the buyer’s monopsony power. Fifthly, MarkSize (market 
size in standard units of ATC j in country i at time t) refers to the hypothesis that larger 
market  size  is  negatively  correlated  with  drug  prices  due  to  two  reasons:  fiercer 
                                                 
9 The anatomical therapeutic class (ATC) is a system of classifying drugs into classes according to 
the intended treatment of the drug. For instance, ATC J05 stands for HIV antiviral drugs.   13 
competition for the higher sales volume on the supplier side; potential formation of bigger 
monopsony power on the consumer side (Levison, 2003). Finally, the pooled estimation 
equation  also includes country  and time  dummies  and  an error term to  control for the 
cross-country  and  time  dimensions  as  well  as  any  stochastic  variation.  Table  3 




Table 3: Hypothesised Determinants of Real Public Drug Prices 
Dependent Variable: 
Real  Public  Drug  Prices  in  US  $ 
(PPP) per standard unit 
 
   




GDPpc/100  + 
  CPI  + or - 
  TRIPS  + 
  Health/GDP  - 
  MarkSize/1,000,000  - 
 
3.3  Data  
Two datasets are utilised for the subsequent analyses: Drug price data and market size 
data  are  retrieved  from  the  IMS  Health  MIDAS  Quantum  Database.  Data  for  all  other 
variables comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2006 Database provided 
by the World Bank on an annual basis. 
 
In order to make drug prices in a cross-country analysis framework comparable this paper 
uses  average  real  public  prices  per  standard  unit  in  US  dollars  PPP  as  dependent 
variable. A  calculation  is  required  to  retrieve this data:  Nominal  public  drug  prices per 
standard unit provided by IMS are converted according to PPP exchange rates supplied by 
the WDI 2006 database into international dollars (PPP). This method, in contrast to official 
exchange rates, has the advantage that the cross-country variation of public prices per 
standard  unit  is  now  comparable  in  terms  of  local  purchasing  power  affordability.  For   14 
Malaria drug price data is available for all seven countries for all years. Concerning HIV/ 
AIDS there is only data for Malaysia, the Philippines and South Africa; additionally, some 
price data is provided for Thailand, but not for all years. Thus, for Malaria there are in total 
seventy-seven observations for drug prices encompassing the seven countries and eleven 
years. In the case of HIV/ AIDS there are thirty-nine observations for drug prices in four 
countries for eleven years, with one and four missing observations for the Philippines and 
Thailand  respectively.  Furthermore,  quarterly  market  size  data  measured  in  sales  of 
standard units per ATC is available for both disease areas, except for the same missing 
country observations as already stated above. Data provided by WDI is complete, with 
exception of total health expenditures as percentage of GDP. Latter is only available for 
the period 1997 to 2003; hence, it was decided to extrapolate the existing data using a 
simple  OLS  regression  technique  to  expand  the  data  to  range  from  1994  to  2004. 
Moreover, since data for all WDI variables is provided on an annual basis, the quarterly 
IMS data was transformed using simple yearly averages. 
 
Finding comparable price data in order to conduct a cross-country paper on drug pricing in 
developing and emerging countries is highly complex for three reasons: First, statistical 
data on historical drug prices is rare in the developing world. Secondly, package size and 
dosage of medicaments do not only vary across countries, but also across pharmaceutical 
companies competing in the same therapy. Thirdly, prices charged at each level in the 
distribution  chain  are  the  result  of  a  multitude  of  different  pricing  issues  as  explained 
above. To our knowledge, IMS Health is the only company offering complete data on a 
range of local pharmaceutical prices and market shares in the developing world. Using 
sources such as manufacturer, wholesaler and government price lists as well as industry 
publications  IMS  Health  collects  sales  and  price  data  on  the  level  within  the 
pharmaceutical market supply and distribution chain that will provide the most accurate 
information for the specific country. In general, data is collected for one of the following 
three levels: manufacturing, wholesaler and pharmacy selling price. Subsequently, using a 
predefined  country-specific  mark-up  factor  IMS  Health  converts  the  price  and  sales 
information collected for one level to the other two levels (IMS Health, 2006). According to 
IMS Health the mark-up factors are continually updated based on information derived from 
the supplier as well as the consumer side. Moreover, since drugs of different firms come in 
various sizes and forms IMS Health also provides prices per standard unit in order to make 
a meaningful comparison of drug prices within an ATC possible. The price per standard   15 
unit is calculated by equating “the price of all preparations to the standard solid dosage of 
one  tablet,  which  means  the  dose  equivalent  is  being  compared  independent  of 
preparation”  (IMS  Health,  2006:  11).  Overall,  the  data  reporting  procedure  of  the  IMS 
Health MIDAS Quantum Database, however, can involve three potential complications for 
the  empirical  cross-country  analysis  conducted  in  the  subsequent  chapter:  First,  the 
predefined country-specific average conversion factors can distort actual sales and price 
values. Secondly, the calculations applied to retrieve the price per standard unit can also 
lead  to  biased  results  if  the  price  and  the  sales  volume  data  have  been  collected  at 
different  levels  (IMS  Health,  2006).
10  Thirdly,  price  and  sales  volume  data  can  also 
become distorted if the value added tax (VAT) is included in one level or country, but not in 
the  other.  When  considering  the  dataset  of  this  study  in  light  of  these  data  gathering 
problems the first complication can pose the only true problem for the empirical analysis of 
this study.
11 However, country-specific conversion factors are continuously updated by IMS 
Health and the risk of biased results is therefore minimised. 
 
4  Results 
4.1  Explorative Analysis 
The first part of the explorative analysis is directed at the mark-up factors defined by IMS 
Health  for  each  country.  Figure  2  presents  the  mark-up  as  a  percentage  of  the 
manufacturing selling price of drug products. It is reported as a constant across ATC and 
only  disposes  small  variations  over  time  for  each  country.  The  highest  mark-up,  as 
calculated by IMS Health, exists in South Africa. It hereby amounts to eighty-two percent 
of the manufacturing selling price. The other countries follow with an average mark-up 
range of forty to fifty-nine percent of the manufacturing selling price.
12  
 
                                                 
10 This complication can be explained for “example in Switzerland where prices are held at the 
Public level [pharmacy selling price] but volume is held at the Ex-manufacturer level. The prices are 
converted to Trade and Ex-manufacturer, however SHP is based on volume and so conversions are 
then required to come back up from the Ex-manufacturer level to Trade and then Public” (IMS 
Health, 2006: 11). 
11 With exception of Morocco, price and sales volume data is collected on the same level for all 
countries. Furthermore, price and sales volume data for each country either include or exclude the 
VAT simultaneously. 
12 In this context, the Philippines, with a mark-up of only eighteen percent, are considered to be an 
outlier. More research on the country has to be conducted since this figure seems to be remarkably 
low.    16 
Figure 2: Mark-Up as Percentage of Manufacturing Selling Price, 2006 
 
 
Source: IMS Health Midas Database 
 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, wholesalers and retailers in the USA dispose an average mark-up 
of forty percent in total. With the exception of New Zealand (twenty-three percent) and 
Austria (one hundred fifty percent) most OECD countries dispose an average mark-up in 
the range of forty to sixty percent of the manufacturing selling price. However, although 
latter is similar with the results retrieved earlier for the seven countries under inspection, it 
cannot be concluded that the procurement and distribution activities in the developing and 
emerging  countries  are  as  efficient  as  in  the  OECD  world.  This  controversy  can  be 
explained  in  the  following  way:  Critics  of  the  TRIPS  Agreement  state  that  the  local 
population in developing countries cannot afford medicaments, because innovator brand 
companies impose excessive drug prices. According to this view inefficiencies along the 
procurement chain only have a minor impact, if at all, on local drug prices. If this argument 
is  valid,  wholesale  and  retail  mark-ups  as  percentage  of  seemingly  excessive 
manufacturing selling prices should be by far lower in the developing countries than in 
OECD countries due to much lower labour and transport costs. However, this is not the 
case  in  reality.  The  seven  countries  under  inspection  have  similar  or  sometimes  even 
higher local mark-ups than OECD member states. Inefficient procurement and distribution 
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In  the  second  part  of  the  explorative  analysis  public  price  trends  are  inspected  for 
structural breaks related to the implementation of TRIPS in the various countries. Figure 3 
displays the time trends of real public prices in international dollars (PPP) per standard unit 
for HIV/ AIDS related drugs. Most remarkable is hereby the decline of real public drug 
prices by more than eighty percent for South Africa and almost thirty percent for Malaysia. 
It was most likely caused by the massive political pressure that global AIDS activist groups 
put on the pharmaceutical industry to lower the prices and thereby make HIV antivirals 
affordable for the local population.
13 Furthermore, Thailand had a short term price hike 
from 1999-2001 before prices declined to the initial low prices. However, the data series is 
not complete; hence, one can only infer the overall price development. The drug price data 
related to HIV antivirals clearly shows that none of the countries above experienced a 







Finally, Figure 4 displays the time trend of real public prices in international dollars (PPP) 
per  standard  unit  for  Malaria  related  drugs.  While  Malaysia
15  and  the  Philippines 
                                                 
13 More information on South Africa will be provided in the case paper. See section 4. 
14 The Philippines are the only exception with major price increases over the observation period. 
Given the low HIV/ AIDS prevalence rate in the country results are not really meaningful. 
15 The dramatic price increase took place before TRIPS was implemented in Malaysia. See section 
4 for more information on Malaysia. 
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experienced a dramatic (almost three hundred percent) and a slight (15 percent) increase 
in real public prices respectively for the period 1994-2004 prices in Thailand, by contrast, 
fell to one third of their original level.
16 Overall, no clear structural break in the real public 





In conclusion, the explorative analysis reveals that none of the observed trends in real 
public prices of medicaments against HIV/ AIDS or Malaria exhibits a dramatic structural 
break  or  an  overall  increase  in  price  levels  due  to  the  implementation  of  the  TRIPS 
Agreement in the countries under inspection. The implication is that TRIPS has, if at all, 
only a minor impact on drug price development and hence on the affordability of drugs in 
the seven countries. Other factors are most likely more important which is reflected in the 
overall falling price trend for many drugs in a multitude of countries. Furthermore, despite 
remaining differences in prices across countries one can observe an overall convergence 
pattern  towards  generally  lower  prices,  except  for  Malaria  related  drugs  that  tend  to 
diverge  slightly  over  time.  Another  striking  fact  is  the  dramatic  decline  of  HIV  antiviral 
prices in South Africa which has most likely been caused by supply side changes, but also 
by intensive campaigning of global AIDS activist groups.  
                                                 
16 In the remaining countries the real public price trends were rather stable, with the exception of 
South Africa. However, results for these four countries can be neglected since they are hardly 
affected by Malaria. 
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4.2  Econometric Analysis 
Against the background of the general results obtained in the graphical depiction of price 
trends  a  quantitative  paper  is  conducted.  As  specified  in  section  2.1  a  pooled  OLS 
regression  technique  is  applied  in  order  to  test  the  hypothesised  determinants  of  real 
public drug prices. The results are displayed in Table 5. Regressions (1) and (2) show the 
results for annual real public drug prices in international dollars (PPP) per standard unit for 
HIV/ AIDS and Malaria respectively. The variable GDP pc has been divided by 100 and 
the  variable  MarkSize  has  been  divided  by  1,000,000  in  order  to  give  meaningfully 
interpretable coefficients.  All regressions control for country and time effects. 
 
Table 4: Pooled OLS Regression Results for Yearly Real Public Prices for HIV and Malaria 
(1994-2004) 
       Real Public Prices in US $ (PPP) per SU   
        (1)      (2) 
        HIV      MAL 
Constant      8.716      -0.446 
        (0.35)      (-0.57) 
GDPpc/100      -0.144      0.011 
        (-1.01)      (1.34) 
CPI        0.127      0.016 
        (0.82)      (3.23)*** 
Health/GDP      -0.170      -0.597 
        (-0.01)      (-0.93) 
MarkSize/1,000,000    -0.267      -0.021 
        (-3.41)***    (-2.28)** 
TRIPS        -1.056      0.083 
        (-0.78)      (1.05) 
Observations      39      77 
R-squared      0.71      0.94 
 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The results of regressions (1) and (2) reported in Table 5 show that TRIPS do not have a 
positive significant effect on local drug prices. GDPpc behaves negative in regression (1) 
and  positive in regression  (2). The negative, but  statistically  insignificant  coefficient for 
GDPpc in regression (1) is driven by the rapid real public price decline of HIV antivirals in 
South Africa which is the richest of the four countries under investigation. The covariate 
CPI implies a positive relationship between general price level increases and real public 
drug prices for both regressions. The control variable Health/ GDP is characterised by very   20 
low t-statistics. No impact whatsoever can be inferred. Furthermore, MarkSize is highly 
negative and significant in both regression specifications and behaves as expected. For 
example,  an  increase  by  10,000,000  standard  units  in  market  size  for  Malaria  related 
products would lower the real public price by 0.21 US $ PPP per standard unit due to 
fiercer competition for higher sales volumes on the supplier side and potential formation of 
monopsony power on the consumer side. This result strengthens the argument that larger 
drug markets  or  increased  procurement  size  by  any  single  agent,  whether  a  state,  an 
international  organisation  or  a  global  initiative,  allows  the  buyer  to  lower  drug  prices 
significantly.  
 
Given the explorative analysis above, the results of the regressions concerning the TRIPS 
time dummy are not surprising. It can be now concluded with greater confidence that the 
implementation of TRIPS has not led to a real public drug price increase for HIV/AIDS or 
Malaria  products  in  the  seven  countries  under  inspection.  If  TRIPS  had  a  dominating 
impact  on  prices  in most  countries the regressions  would  certainly identify a  structural 
break. Summarizing, the results of the explorative analysis have all been confirmed in the 
econometric paper. In the seven countries under empirical investigation, country-specific 
price determinants have a more important impact on local drug prices in the two analysed 
disease areas than TRIPS. 
 
5  Conclusion 
In the seven selected middle income countries the introduction of TRIPS had no major 
long lasting impact on local drug price development in the area of HIV/ AIDS and Malaria. 
Both the explorative as well as the econometric analysis do not find any structural break or 
any positive correlation between the date of TRIPS enforcement and an increase in real 
public  drug  prices.  From  the  presented  findings,  two  policy  conclusions  emerge:  First, 
reducing  the  high  mark-up  costs  for  drugs  is  a  main  area  for  policy  intervention  in 
developing and emerging economies. Secondly, policy coherence is essential for avoiding 
negative effects of existing IP regulations.  
 
Efficient procurement activities are key to affordable drug prices. Minimising inefficiencies 
requires  a  combined  governmental  policy that  takes  both the  supplier’s  as well  as the 
consumer’s side into account. On the supplier side governments should define mark-ups   21 
and price caps for drugs throughout the supply chain from manufacturer or importer to 
end-buyer. On the consumer side governments should aim at pooling patients in order to 
create monopsony power when bargaining with pharmaceutical companies. Besides these 
measures all pharmaceuticals should be exempt from tariffs, non-tariff barriers and taxes. 
Although governments in the developing world have begun to realise that tariffs and taxes 
on medicaments aggravate the public health situation in their countries, some still consider 
them  as  a  much  needed  source  of  state  revenue.  Finally,  governments  should  also 
optimise the use of TRIPS safeguards in order to enhance generic competition. As the 
case  paper  Malaysia  has  shown,  if  TRIPS  safeguards  are  not  used,  pharmaceutical 
companies will be keen on charging higher prices. 
 
OECD countries can also make a significant contribution to render drugs in developing 
countries more affordable. In this context, Cecilia Oh proposes a “formula for fairness” 
consisting  of  the  following  three  components:  “Advocacy  for  effective  use  of  TRIPS 
safeguards;  Balance  in  patent,  trade  and  development  policies;  Cooperation  and 
coherence  between  national  governments,  international  organisations  and  civil  society” 
(Oh, 2005: 27). Striking a balance between asserting own strategic economic interests 
(primarily in the areas of patent and trade policy) and strengthening aid effectiveness in 
the health sector of developing countries poses a great challenge for policymakers in the 
OECD  world.  However,  while  the  damage  of  infectious  diseases  has  been 
disproportionately shared in the developing world, “it is worth bearing in mind that in this 
age  of  air-travel,  diseases  that  have  been  wiped  out  in  the  rich  countries  could  be 
reintroduced in them rather quickly. Thus, even if one were to ignore the urgent morale 
case […], a narrowly perceived notion of self-interest on the part of richer countries calls 
for them” to support efforts to make drugs affordable (Saggi, 2006: 5).  
 
Against  this  background  OECD  countries  should  advise  developing  countries  how  to 
effectively  use  TRIPS  safeguards.  More  precise,  capacity  building  guidance  should  be 
given in order to make the administrative and legal infrastructure adequate for the use of 
TRIPS  safeguards.  As  long  as  existing  deficiencies  in  the  institutional  setting  prevail 
developing countries will not be able to use TRIPS flexibilities in practice. In this context, 
recent attempts to tighten TRIPS rules by applying a carrot and stick policy approach with 
respect  to  free  trade  agreements  and  TRIPS+  provisions  have  not  been  beneficial  for 
achieving this goal.   22 
   
Besides  acting  as  advisors  OECD  countries  should  also  strengthen  their  financial 
contribution  (for  instance  “tax  on  airline  ticket  initiative”)  in  order  to  make  drugs  more 
affordable.  Encouraging  stronger  collaboration  and  harmonisation  between  all 
stakeholders in the development aid arena is a necessary prerequisite to make foreign 
assistance in the health sector of developing countries effective. A particular emphasis 
should hereby be devoted to public-private partnerships. In this context, pull programs play 
a prominent role. One kind of pull program is the “purchase commitment in which sponsors 
would commit to purchase a specified number of doses at a specified price if a vaccine 
meeting certain specifications were developed” (Kremer, 2002: 83). Such a pull program 
creates a win-win situation for both the supplier as well as the sponsor of the requested 
drugs: Pharmaceutical companies do not face any problem of time-inconsistency when 
researching  and  producing  the drug  while  donors  pay  lower  prices  due  to  monopsony 
power.  Overall,  local  populations  in  developing  countries  would  benefit  from  both 
affordable as well as state of the art drug products. 
 
While these results are considered to be valid for middle income countries that have a 
capacity to produce drugs themselves one has to act with caution when generalising these 
findings with regards to least developed countries. On the medium- to long-term horizon 
TRIPS can have a negative effect on the public health situation in these countries in case 
of two specific circumstances: First, generic companies in middle income countries (such 
as India or Brazil) can be forced to exit the market due to TRIPS enforcement; secondly, 
as  a  reaction  to  the  latter  generic  companies  might  aim  to  upgrade  their  business  to 
become innovator drug manufacturers. In such scenarios developing countries which do 
not dispose pharmaceutical production know-how will face a severe health crisis in the 
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A  Construction of the Price Indices for the Cross-Country Analysis 
 
A.1  Methodological Procedure 
 
Patent, off-patent and generic drug products make up the price index (for each disease 
area and each country) which is weighted according to their annual country-specific sales. 
Close attention has hereby been paid that drugs under patent protection have a significant 
share in the price index in order to measure potential effects of TRIPS. Since drugs of   29 
different  firms  come  in  various  sizes  and  forms  the  prices  per  standard  unit  are 
incorporated  in  order  to  make  a  meaningful  comparison  of  drug  prices  within  an 
anatomical therapy class (ATC) possible. The price per standard unit provided by IMS 
Health is calculated by equating “the price of all preparations to the standard solid dosage 
of  one  tablet,  which  means  the  dose  equivalent  is  being  compared  independent  of 
























A.2  List of HIV/ AIDS antiretrovirals included in the price index for South 
Africa in 2004 
 
Medicament  Patent Expiry Date 
Trizivar  04/2011 
Ziagen  12/2010 
Viramune  11/2010 
Combivir  04/2011 
Duovir  04/2011 
Forto-Vase  12/2010 
Aspen Lamzid  04/2011 
Avocomb  04/2011 
Stocrin  08/2013 
Nevran  11/2010   30 
Aspen Zidovudine  No patent protection 
Aspen Nevirapine  11/2010 
Retrovir  No patent protection 
Zidaid  No patent protection 
Hivid  No patent protection 
Videx  No patent protection 
Invi-rase  12/2010 
Vira-cept  No patent protection 
Crixivan  11/2012 
3TC  04/2011 
Aspen Didanosine  No patent protection 
Kaletra  12/2016 
Cipla-Lamivudine  04/2011 
Zidovir  No patent protection 
Lamaid  04/2011 
Aspen Lamivudine  04/2011 
Norvir  No patent protection 
Zerit  05/2009 
Aspen Stavudine  05/2009 
Stavir  05/2009 
Source: IMS Health MIDAS Database (2006).   
 
 
As explained in A.1 close attention has been paid that drugs under patent protection have 
a significant share in the price index. A.2 provides as an example the list of all HIV/ AIDS 
antiretrovirals included in the price index (for disease area HIV/ AIDS) for South Africa in 






B   Theoretical Components of a Public Price Mark-up   31 
 
Source: Own Depiction   
Public Price  Manufacturing Price + Mark-up 
Manufacturing Price  Production Costs + Producers Profit 
 
Mark-Up 
Customs and Excises  
Transportation Costs 
Storage Costs 
Labour Costs 
Retail Profits 
Red Tape 
Corruption 